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I. Introduction
For a long time, European integration has been said to come at the expense of national parliaments. Andrew Moravcsik's conclusion that European integration had strengthened the executives of nation states 1 has found widespread agreement. Even as the powers of the European Parliament (EP) have been expanded to a significant degree, national parliaments have been regarded to be the losers during the integration process, similar to regional parliaments in federal states, which have seen inroads into their capacities to act effectively as intergovernmental relations have evolved. This "decline of parliaments" has been considered as the main cause of the democratic deficit of the EU.
This portray of European democracy contrasts with normative ideas. The important role of member states in policy-making is one of the reasons why lower level parliaments, i.e.
national and (where they exist) sub-national parliaments, have always been accorded a place in asserting the democratic legitimacy of EU policy-making. However, these normative claims have proved to raise complicated problems when put into practice. It was not until the mid 1990s that national parliaments have attracted attention in European politics. Indeed, as
Simon Hix and Tapio Raunio observed ten years ago, parliaments have fought back. 2 They have responded to the encroachments of "executive federalism" à la Europe. However instead of fighting for veto power, as some experts have suggested, they have developed a broader set of instruments in order to assure a role for themselves.
Meanwhile, the Treaty of Lisbon acknowledges parliaments of the member states as institutions contributing to democratic legitimacy in a multilevel polity. It is in particular the "early warning mechanism" of subsidiarity control which gives them power to influence the * Arthur Benz is professor for political science at the Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany. Following these developments, the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced additional rules relating to national parliaments. They are not only acknowledged as institutions contributing to democratic legitimacy, they also have acquired rights to intervene in the definition of competences by the Commission, the Council or the EP, if they apply powers shared between the EU and the member states, and to participate in negotiations on amendments to the Treaties.
II. Increasing powers of parliaments in the EU
As regards the application of powers in the EU, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)
stipulates that the Commission has to forward all initiatives for legislation directly to national parliaments. On this basis, parliaments can check whether an initiative conforms to the principle of subsidiarity. Otherwise, they can issue their opinion to the Commission. If parliaments with at least one third of their votes object to a legislative proposal, the Commission is obliged to reconsider the issue. If it pursues the proposal against a majority of parliamentary votes, it has to report to the Council and the EP, which both can reject the initiative by majority decision. In addition to this procedure which initiates political reasoning on the application of the subsidiarity principle, each national parliament can bring a legal act to the ECJ by claiming an infringement of this principle.
National parliaments, together with the EP, also monitor and evaluate measures of the EU taken in the areas of security and law. These policies affect the core powers of nation states and concern the identity of national societies. For this reason, national parliaments are accorded particular influence. Moreover, they have a say when it comes to the application of flexibility clauses allowing the change of decision rules in the legislative process. Again such a change affects basic rights of a member state to defend its national interests.
When Treaty amendments are on the EU agenda, representatives of national parliaments participate in a Convention which, according to the ordinary procedure, should be called for preparing Treaty amendments. Still the rule holds that amendments have to be ratified by all member states according to their constitutional provisions. This rule gives each national parliament a veto right. 
III. The need for horizontal structures in representative democracy
The Treaty amendments summarized in the preceding chapter assign different roles to national parliaments, part of them being shared with the EP. They formalized processes which have emerged during the previous decade. When Treaties are revised, representatives of national parliaments participate in negotiations on amendment proposals. As institutions parliaments maintained the right to veto an amendment in the ratification process. The 
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By including parliaments in a mechanism designed to control the application of shared powers allocated to the EU, the Lisbon Treaty explicitly turns subsidiarity from a legal norm into a procedural rule. It also calls national parliaments to form coalitions in order to give more weight to their institutional interests. The more parliaments cooperate, the more they can accumulate countervailing forces against the transfer of powers to the European level. 
IV. Patterns of evolving inter-parliamentary relations
The So far it is difficult to evaluate the effects of the emerging patterns of "multilevel parliamentarism". It may be true "that the current forms and levels of such cooperation are unlikely to change in the future". 
V. Conclusion
Integration and democratic legitimacy in a compounded polity like the EU require crossborder relations of those represented on the upper level. As long as we cannot assume that and national parliaments requires to "conceive of democratic representation as the result of the interplay of a multiplicity of processes that need to be assessed on the basis of their overall effect". 27 However, the horizontal dimension of inter-parliamentary relations has to be included in the construction of an appropriate concept of compounded representation.
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